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In Metaphysics Z 13 Aristotle argues that no universal can be substance. Prima
facie, this appears to rule out the possibility that any universal can be substance,
species as well as genera. Nevertheless, many commentators have denied that
this chapter intends to rule out the possibility that any universal can be sub-
stantial. Aristotle, it is thought, cannot wish to deny that any universal can be
substance because he believes that some universals are substances, viz. species.
So Aristotle is denying only that genera as opposed to species can be substance.
1
In this paper I will argue that in Z 13 Aristotle does intend to deny that any
universal can be substance. I shall proceed as follows. First I shall examine the
argument in 1038
b8-15 and suggest two possible interpretations. On either
interpretation the argument contends that no universal — including species —
can be substantial. Next I consider and reject the intrepretation of the argument
according to which it is intended to rule out genera as substances but allows that
species can be substances. Finally, I shall briefly consider and reject Michael
Woods's interpretation of the chapter.
At 1038
b8-15 Aristotle presents the following argument:
For it seems to be impossible that anything predicated universally be substance. For, first
of all, the substance of each thing is private to it, does not belong to anything else, but the
universal is common. For that is called universal which naturally belongs to many things. Of
what will this be substance? Either of all or of none, but it cannot be of all. But if it is to be
<the substance> of one thing the rest will be identical with this. For those things whose
substance and essence are one are themselves one.
2
At first sight, Ross's interpretation
3 of the argument seems quite plausible. It
goes: The universal cannot be substance because the substance of a thing belongs
to it alone and to nothing else, whereas the universal is precisely that which
belongs to many things. This seems quite straightforward, but the rest of the
argument raises problems. According to Ross it should be read: Of what will the
1 Michael Woods, 'Problems in Meta- bei Aristoteles (Hamburg, 1938), p. 45
physics Z, Chapter 13', in J. Moravcsik n. 67; J. Moreau, Aristote et son ecole
(ed.), Aristotle (New York, 1967), p. 216; (Paris, 1962), pp. 148-9; R. Rorty, 'Genus
R. Albritton, 'Forms of Particular Substances as Matter', in Lee, Mourelatos, Rorty (eds.),
in Aristotle's Metaphysics', Journal of Exegesis and Argument (Assen, 1973),
Philosophy, 54 (1957), 705; J. Moreau, p. 413.
'Sein und Wesen in der Philosophic des
 2 eoine yap aSvvarov eivai ovolav elvai
Aristoteles', in Fritz-Peter Hager (ed.), Meta- bruovv TCJV KO.6O\OV \eyopevu>v • •npCnov /lev
physik und Theologie des Aristoteles yap obola eKaorov il c6io<r kKaoTU?, f\ o&x.
(Darmstadt, 1969), p. 231; C. Werner, vnapxei #\A.qj, rd Be KadoKov KOWOVTOVTO
Aristote et I'idealisme platonicien (Paris, yap \eyerai nafioXov o nXeioow vnap\ew
1910), p. 66 n. 1, and La Philosophic ne<pvKev- rlvos oiv oiiaia TOVT' carat; fi yap
grecque (Paris, 1972), p. 118; R. D. Hicks, navrijjv fj ovSevos, TT&VTUJV 6' oi>x olov re •
Aristotle: De Anitna (Cambridge, 1907), evoq 8' ei eorai, nal raWa TOVT' forai- u>v
p. 187; N. Hartmann, 'Aristoteles und das yap fiia rj oiiaia nai TO TIT\V e'cvai eV, «ai airra
Problem der Begriffs', in Kleinere Schriften ev •
ii (Berlin, 1957), 106, and 'Zur Lehre vom Many of my translations in this paper are
Eidos bei Platon und Aristoteles', ibid. 137; based on W. D. Ross's translation of the
Chung-Hwan Chen, Sophia (New York, Metaphysics.
1976), p. 576 n. 22; cf. P. Gohlke, Die Lehre
 3 Aristotle's Metaphysics, ii (Oxford,
von der Abstraktion bei Plato und Aristoteles 1924), 210.
(Halle, n.d.), p. 96; C. Arpe, Das rif\v elvaiAN ARGUMENT IN METAPHYSICS Z 13 73
universal be substance? Either of all or of none of the particulars falling under it.
However, we have just seen (9-12) that the universal cannot be the substance of
all of the particulars falling under it because the substance of a thing belongs to
it alone and to nothing else. In reply to this Aristotle's opponent (call him the
Platonist) proposes that the universal might be the substance of only one of the
particulars falling under it. This, Aristotle replies, is impossible because if the
universal were-the substance of one member of the class of objects falling under
it, that member would have to be identical with the rest of the members of the
class. For the universal would be no less the substance of the other members of
the class, and those things whose substance and essence are one are themselves
one. So the assumption that, as is proper to substance, the universal is the sub-
stance of one thing alone yields the absurd conclusion that, since the universal
is that which naturally belongs to many, the particulars falling under a universal
are identical. Therefore, as was said, the universal must be the substance of
either all or none of the particulars falling under it. And since, by 9-12 the
universal cannot be the substance of all the particulars falling under it, it is the
substance of none of them.
Michael Woods has pointed out a problem with this interpretation which
casts doubt on its correctness.
4 The difficulty lies in 12-15 and can be made
clear if we set out the argument in the following way. Suppose a, b, and c are
all the particulars falling under the universal F. Then the argument is,
(1) Let F be the substance of a
(2) Those things whose substance is one are themselves one
Therefore, a, b and c are identical.
The conclusion clearly follows from (1) and (2) only with the help of the further
premise
(3) F is the substance of b and c.
Now, Ross understands (1) to mean
(l') F is the substance of a, and of nothing else.
So understood, (1) contradicts (3). Since (3) is a necessary premiss for the
argument, Ross's interpretation of (1) makes Aristotle's premisses inconsistent.
Or in other words, the Platonist asserts (1) (i.e. (l')) to meet the first objection
(9-12), but Aristotle simply ignores this and compels him to accept (3) without
argument.
It is clear that the argument is valid only if F is being assumed to be the sub-
stance of every member of its extension — a, b, and c. So (3) must be retained.
If Aristotle's premisses are to be made consistent, then, (1) cannot be taken to
mean (l'). Ross interpreted (1) to mean (l') because he thought that the argu-
ment is intended to refute the suggestion expressed in the words 'but if it is to
be <the substance> of one thing' (£JW 6' el e'arat), where this is the Platonist's
attempt to meet the condition laid down by Aristotle in 10 that substance is
private to that object of which it is the substance. Hence, if we do not take 'but
if it is to be <the substance> of one thing' as the proposition Aristotle is trying
to refute, (1) need not be understood as in (1 ), that is, it need not be taken to
4 Problems in Metaphysics Z, Chapter 13, op. cit., pp. 217-19.74 ROBERT HEINAMAN
contradict (3). It is possible, I think, that 1038
b12-15 should be understood as
an argument which is independent of 9-12, and in such a way that 'but if it is to
be <the substance> of one thing' is not taken to be a countermove to 9-12 on
the part of the Platonist. Rather, the argument might be understood in the
following way: Of what will F be the substance? ('Of what will this be substance?')
Either of a, b, and c or of none of them. ('Either of all or of none.') But F
cannot be the substance of a, b, and c. ('But it cannot be of all.') (And now the
basis for this last statement is not the previous argument in 9-12, but the argu-
ment which follows, viz.:) For if F is the substance of even one of them, say a,
then b and c will be identical with a.
s ('But if it is to be <the substance> of
one thing, the rest will be identical with this.') For those things whose substance
and essence are one are themselves one. Therefore, since F is the substance
either of all or of none of the particulars falling under it, and it cannot be the
substance of all, it is the substance of none.
Thus understood, it is clear why (1) must not be taken to mean (1 ), and why
'those things whose substance and essence are one are themselves one' pre-
supposes that every member of the extension of F has F as its substance. For it
is precisely the view that a universal is the substance of every member of its
extension that Aristotle is arguing against. He gives the alternatives 'Either of
all or of none,' asserts 'but it cannot be of all,' and then proceeds to give his
argument why it is not possible. So no problem arises if we take the argument
to be directed against 'of all' {itamiov) rather than 'of one' (evos).
6
However, the argument can also be understood differently. This alternative
interpretation is suggested by the argument in 1038
b16-23 which seems to me
to be exactly parallel to the one we are considering. It runs,
So the universal cannot be substance in the way that essence is, but can it belong to this,
as animal belongs to man and horse? Therefore it is clear that it is a kind of definition of
it. Nor does it matter if it is not a definition of everything in the substance; none the less
this will be the substance of something, as man of the man in which it occurs, so that the
same thing will result again; for it will be the substance of that, such as the animal, in which
alone it occurs.
Although I cannot justify it here, 1 construe the argument as follows. Sup-
pose that the universal can be substance as belonging to essence in the way in
which the genus animal belongs to the species man and horse. Therefore it is
clear that it (e.g. the genus animal) is a kind of definition of the essence (e.g.
the species man). It does not matter if animal is not the definition of every-
thing in the substance man; nevertheless animal will be the substance of
s L. Robin seems to suggest something
like this, in La Theorie platonicienne des
Idees et des Nombres d'apres Aristote
(Paris, 1908), p. 36. Also cf. G. Grote,
Aristotle, ii (London, 1872), 342-3.
6 Although H. F. Cherniss (Aristotle's
Criticism of Plato and the Academy (New
York, 1962), p. 318 n. 220) construes the
premiss 'those things whose substance and
essence are one are themselves one' (14) as
providing a ground, not for the conclusion
that b and c are identical with a (13-14),
but for saying that F must be the substance
'it is hard not to take 11.14-15 (w -yap
nia . . .) as providing a reason for what is
asserted immediately before, especially as
it is readily intelligible as a reason for it.'
(Michael Woods, 'Problems in Metaphysics
Z, Chapter 13', op cit., p. 219). And that
premiss is used for the same conclusion in at
least two other places in the Metaphysics
(999
b21-2, 1040
b17). See below.
7 On the use of this example in the
argument see Cherniss, ACPA, op. cit.,
p. 320 n. 223. It is also possible, however,
that Aristotle is using the term 'man' and
of all of a, b, and c or none of them (12-13), 'horse' in 18 to refer to the souls of a manAN ARGUMENT IN METAPHYSICS Z 13 75
something, as man is the substance of the man in which it occurs in the first
argument, i.e. 1038
b8-15. So that the same thing will result again. For the
genus animal will be the substance of that, such as the individual animal, in
which alone it occurs.
The language which Aristotle uses in 1038
b16-23 suggests another way of
understanding 1038
b8-15. The language I am referring to is 'as man is sub-
stance of the man in which it occurs' and 'in which alone it occurs', and it
exemplifies the point which Aristotle makes at 1038
b9-10: 'For, first of all, the
substance of each thing is private to it, does not belong to anything else. . ..'
I take the conception underlying these formulations to be that if F is the sub-
stance of anything, then necessarily it is the substance of one thing, i.e. of some-
thing that is one in number. This is just the force of the premiss: those things
whose substance and essence are one are themselves one. Thus I take the last line
of the argument in 1038
b 16-23 — 'For it (viz. the genus animal) will be the sub-
stance of that, such as the animal, in which alone it occurs' — to be saying that if
the genus animal is substance, then, since any substance is the substance of one
thing, the genus animal must be the substance of the single animal to which it
belongs, i.e. all animals are identical. Now I take 'as man is substance of the man
in which it occurs, so that the same thing will result again' in 22-3 to refer back
to 1038
b8-15. Just as here in 16-23 if animal is substance it must be the sub-
stance of a single animal and so all animals are identical, so there in 8-15 the
hypothesis that man is substance entails that it is the substance of a single man
and hence all men are identical.
The way in which this may clarify 1038
b8-15 is that it explains the line:
'But if it is to be the substance of one, the rest will be identical with this' in 13.
In both Ross's and my own interpretation above, 'one' in this line was taken to
refer to one of the members of the extension of the universal. What I am now
suggesting is that the line need not be taken in this way but rather as pointing
out what has just been said to be a requirement of substance: 'the substance of
each thing is private to it, does not belong to anything else.' That is, it is saying
that if a universal such as man is substance, then if it is to be the substance of
one thing, as it must be if it is substance, then all men will be this single man.
On either of the proposed interpretations the argument is intended by
Aristotle to show that no universal can be substance. And this is what Aristotle
repeatedly says. 'For it seems to be impossible that anything predicated univer-
sally be substance. (1038
b8-9). 'Nothing universal is substance' (1038
b35).
'Nothing common is substance' (1040
b23). 'Nothing predicated universally is
substance' (1041
a4;cf. 1003
a7-9, 1042
a21, 1060
b21, 1087
a2, 1087
a12). And
in I 2, in what is clearly a reference back to Z 13, he says: 'If, then, no uni-
versal can be substance, as has been said in our discussion of substance and
being . . .' (1053
b16-18;cf. 999
a17-23, 1001
a19-24).
So in chapter 13 of Book Z, as a result of the argument just gone through,
Aristotle explicitly claims that no universal is substance. Further, in I 2 Aristotle
refers back to Z 13 as having established that no universal is substance. Nowhere
in this chapter does Aristotle divide universals into different types and argue that
and a horse (cf. 1043
a36-
b4, 1033
a29, consider to be essences (1017
b14-16, 21-3,
b17-18, 1035^-9,
 bl-3, 1036
a16-17, 1035
b14-16, 1037
a22-9, 1043
b2-4, De
1037
a7-8, De Caelo 278M3-15, De Gen. et Anima 412
b10-17).
Corr. 321
b19-22), which he certainly does76 ROBERT HEINAMAN
one sort of universal cannot be substance but allow that the other sort is or may
 :
be substance. In particular, he does not divide universals into species and genera
and argue that while genera cannot be substances there is nothing to prevent
species from being substances. Nevertheless, as I pointed out at the beginning of
the paper, many commentators have claimed that this is the position of Z 13.
For example, Rogers Albritton says: 'The thesis of Z 13 is primarily that nothing
universal in relation to species, nothing common to species, as their genus or
otherwise, is the substance of any of them (1038
b6-16,1038
b34-1039H)
He seeks to show that nothing common to species can be the substance of any
species.'
8
Now in the first place, this interpretation cannot be supported on the grounds
that by 'universal' Aristotle means to refer to genera and not to infimae species.
For Aristotle constantly refers to the species man as an example of a universal
(e.g. 1033
b24-6, 1035
b27-30, 1037
a5-10, 1058
bll-12, 33;DeInt. 17
a38-
b16;An. Pr. 43
a25-32;y4«. Post. 100
a17-
bl; Top. 141
b29-32;D<? Gen. Anim.
768
a13,
 b13-14; Rhet. 1378
a34). And I believe there is evidence which shows
conclusively that it cannot be correct. The disagreement can be seen as centring
on the interpretation of the premiss: 'For those things whose substance and
essence are one are themselves one.' According to the interpretation I am disputing,
'those things' (uiv) here refers to species, and the premiss says that those species
whose substance and essence are one are themselves one. According to myself,
'those things' refers to individuals and the premiss says that those things whose
essence and substance are one are themselves one in number.
9
One difficulty with Albritton's interpretation of 1038
b8-15 as arguing for the
thesis that no genus is the substance of any of the species contained in it is that it
can give no reasonable explanation either of this premiss or of the resulting argu-
ment. According to it, 'those things whose substance and essence are one are
themselves one' is the premiss which allows us to conclude that if, say, animal is
the substance and essence of man and horse, then man and horse are one. How-
ever, it is now faced with the difficulty of specifying in what sense it will turn out
that man and horse are one, and in such a way that the following conditions are
met: (i) the argument cannot impose on the Platonist a requirement for being
substance which Aristotle himself does not accept; (ii) the first premiss (i.e.
'those things whose substance and essence are one are themselves one') must be
a proposition which Aristotle accepts or can accept; (iii) the conclusion of the
argument must be a conclusion which Aristotle rejects or cannot accept. For the
argument is a reduction ad absurdum and (as I shall set it out) it is the second
premiss which is being reduced to absurdity. Now, the possibly relevant senses
of 'one' appear to be 'one in number', 'one in species', and 'one in genus'. So
let us consider how the argument would run on each of these interpretations.
On the assumption that the relevant sense of 'one' is 'one in number' the
argument is:
8 'Forms of Particulars in Aristotle's ' It is so understood by Ps.-Alexander
Metaphysics', op. cit., p. 705. Cf. Syranius' (In Aristotelis Metaphysica Commentaria,
reply to Aristotle's argument in Asclepius' ed. M. Hayduck (Berlin, 1891), 523-4,
commentary (In Metaphysicorum Libros Asclepius, op. cit. 430 and Syranius, in
A-Z Commentaria, ed. M. Hayduck (Berlin, Asclepius, 433.
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(1) Those species whose substance is a genus which is one in number are them-
selves one in number.
(2) The substance of man and horse is the genus animal, which is one in
number.
Therefore, man and horse are one in number.
The argument so construed fails to meet the first condition. On Albritton's
interpretation of our passage the argument as it stands has no force against the
suggestion that animal is the substance of man and horse. For the argument
assumes that if the genus animal is the substance of man and horse, then it is one
in number. But that assumption is not open to Aristotle on Albritton's inter-
pretation since according to it being one in number is not a requirement for
being substance.
10 The point of this interpretation is to understand Z 13 in such
a way that it is compatible with species being substances, and species are not one
in number. And if the species man is a substance even though it is not one in
number, then animal may be the substance of man and horse even though it is
not one in number. Furthermore, on this account Aristotle must accept the view
that genera are one in number — individuals — and as an interpretation of
Aristotle that is absurd.
Suppose next that the sense of 'one' in question is 'one in species'. So con-
strued the argument would go:
(1) Those species whose substance is a genus which is one in species are
themselves one in species.
(2) The substance of man and horse is the genus animal, which is one in
species.
Therefore, man and horse are one in species.
This version fails because the first premiss must be a premiss which Aristotle
himself believes to be true. But (1) presupposes that the genus animal is one in
species, and that, in Aristotle's view, is clearly false. As Michael Woods explains,
Aristotle considers an item to be iv eiSei when it is dfiuuperov e'iSei, i.e. 'aronov
in the sense that it is not capable of further differentiation. This is precisely what
is wot the case with y£vr\.'
n On this interpretation, then, the second condition is
not met, and so it too must be rejected.
Finally, suppose that the sense of 'one' in question here is 'one in genus'. Then
the argument would run:
(1) Those species whose substance is a genus which is one in genus are them-
selves one in genus.
(2) The substance of man and horse is the genus animal, which is one in genus.
Therefore, man and horse are one in genus.
This account also fails because it does not meet the third requirement. In Aris-
totle's opinion, the statement that man and horse are one in genus is not absurd
but obviously true (1016*24-7, 1018
b5-6;cf. Top. 103
a13-14).
It appears, then, that Albritton's interpretation of 1038
b8-15 cannot be
correct since on this interpretation the argument in the passage cannot be given
a reasonable explanation. In particular, if, in the premiss 'those things whose
<0 'Forms of Particulars in Aristotle's 13', op. cit., p. 224. Cf. 999*4: T£ 6e yivri
Metaphysics', op. cit., 705. Suupera eU effit), and 1059
a36-7, 1016 24-7,
11 'Problems in Metaphysics Z, Chapter Top. 103
a10-14.78 ROBERT HEINAMAN
substance and essence are one are themselves one', 'those things' is taken to refer
to species and 'substance' to a genus, then no sense of 'one' can be specified such
that the argument is one which Aristotle himself could have advanced.
Furthermore, other passages in the Metaphysics where the same argument is
used count heavily against Albritton's interpretation and in favour of my own.
Of these (cf. 1016
b8-ll, 1018
a5-ll, 1021
all), the most important occurs in
Z 16(1040
b16-27):
But since the one is said just as being, and the substance of one thing is one, and those things
whose substance is one in number are one in number, it is clear that neither the one nor
being can be the substance of things, just as being an element or a principle cannot be. But
we ask what, then, the principle is that we may reduce the thing to something more know-
able. Being and the one would be substance rather than the principle or the element or the
cause, but not even the former are substance, since nothing common is substance; for
substance belongs to nothing but itself and to that which has it, of which it is substance.
Again, that which is one cannot be in many places at the same time, but what is common
occurs in many places at the same time; so it is clear that no universal occurs apart and
separate from particulars.
In the statement ff ovoia 7) TOO £TOC nia, KCU. &V nia cc/oidpicp iv apidiico ('. . . the
substance of one thing is one, and those things whose substance is one in number
are one in number . . .'; cf. Physics 227
b21-2, 228
a7-8,
 bll-13), ewk and nia in
the first clause must be understood as having the same meaning as ilia and ev in
the second clause. So it says that (1) the substance of something one in number
is itself one in number, and (2) those things whose substance is one in number
are themselves one in number.
Now note the last argument ('Again, that which is one . . .'). 'That which is
one' (TO iv) in 25 cannot mean 'that which is one in form' because there is
nothing to prevent what is one in form from being in many places at the same
time. It is what is one in number that cannot be at many places at the same time.
And this means that it cannot belong to many particulars at the same time, as 27
(TO. nad' enaoTa) makes clear.
12 Now, 'common' (KOWOV) in 23 cannot mean any-
thing different from what 'what is common' (TO KOWOV) in 25 means. And there-
fore 22-4 are saying the following: the one and being are not substance, since
nothing which is common to particulars, i.e. no universal, can be substance. For
substance belongs only to itself and to that particular of which it is the substance.
This passage, then, provides strong evidence against Albritton's interpretation
of 1038
b8-15. For it gives an argument against the suggestion that universals are
substance which is exactly parallel to that passage. 1040
b23-4 argues that no
universal can be substance 'since nothing common is substance; for substance
belongs to nothing but itself and that which has it, of which it is substance.' At
1038
b9-12 Aristotle argues that no universal can be substance on the grounds:
'For, first of all, the substance of each thing is private to it, does not belong to
anything else, but the universal is common.' At 1040
b17 Aristotle says that a
universal cannot be substance on the grounds that 'those things whose substance
is one in number are one in number.' At 1038
b14-15 Aristotle argues that no
universal can be substance on the grounds that 'those things whose substance and
essence are one are themselves one.' There can be no doubt that the arguments
in 1040
b 16-27 are the same arguments as those in 1038
b8-15.
13 And so, since
we know that 1040
b 16-27 is arguing that no universal in relation to particulars
12 Cf. Ps.-Alexander, 366, 30-1.
 13 This is confirmed by 1053
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can be substance, 1038
b8-15 too is arguing for the conclusion that no universal
in relation to particulars can be substance.
Another passage which shows the sense of the premiss in question is 999 20-
3: 'Besides these, whether the substance of all things is one, such as of all men?
But that is odd; for all things whose substance is one are one. But is it many and
diverse? That too is unreasonable.' The force of the argument is evidently that if
all individual men have the same substance, then they will be identical with one
another, since all things whose substance is one are themselves one. Here, that
which is hypothesized to be the substance is a species and not a genus, and those
things of which it is hypothesized to be the substance are individual men, not
species.
Furthermore, the solution to the aporia seems to require individual substan-
tial forms. As Albritton says, "Why "many and diverse"? Why not many and the
same in universal formula, like your form and mine in A? The dilemma seems to
invite the question. May we not conclude that Aristotle, though he omits to say
so, has escaped by this route, a theory of particular forms?
14 However, Albritton
proceeds to argue that this conclusion cannot in fact be drawn because there is an
alternative solution to the dilemma. 'One might distinguish, as Aristotle does,
ways of being one, and argue that things whose substance is one need not be one
in every way, but only in that of their substance. But the universal form of man
is not one in number. It is only one in form. And men are one in form. The one
form of man may, therefore, be their substance.
>ls
If Albritton were right, then the initial argument in 999
b20-3 could not be
used to support my interpretation of Z 13, 1038
b8-15, but, on the contrary,
might raise doubts about that interpretation. I take him to be saying that Aris-
totle's response to the aporia in 999
b2O-3 might have been this: the difficulty is
not resolved by positing individual substantial forms. Rather, the initial argu-
ment is ambiguous, and is rendered harmless once it is disambiguated. The argu-
ment is,
(1) Those things whose substance is one are one.
(2) The substance of men is the species man.
Therefore, all men are one.
The sense of the argument depends on what is meant by 'one'. If 'one' means
'one in number', then the conclusion is absurd. But on this reading, the first
premiss is false since it presupposes that the substance of, say, men is one in
number. But the substance of men is the species man, and this is not one in
number but only one in form. So on this reading the argument can be rejected
since it rests on a false premiss. On the other hand, if 'one' means 'one in form',
then the first premiss is true, but also the conclusion is true, not absurd. So on
this reading the argument does nothing towards showing the falsity of the
second premiss.
Even on Albritton's interpretation, the argument would deal with species and
individuals rather than genera and species. However, if his account were accepted,
it might be thought that 1038
b8-15 should be understood in the same way. And
since, on Albritton's account, 999
b20-3 does not aim to refute the view that
species are substances, this might lead to a position similar to that of Michael
14 'Forms of Particular Substances in
 ls Ibid.
Aristotle's Metaphysics', op. cit., p. 705.80 ROBERT HEINAMAN
Woods according to which 1038
b8-15 too is not meant to refute the view that
species are substances, but merely 'forces the Platonist to formulate his position
more carefully'.
16 So Albritton's interpretation of 999
b2O-3 must be refuted if
my own interpretation of 1038
b8-15 is not to be thrown in doubt.
There is, in fact, sufficient evidence to show that Albritton's alternative
escape from the dilemma of 999
b2O-3 could not have been Aristotle's. In the first
place, at 1040
b17 Aristotle tells us that 'the substance of one thing is one', and,
as we have seen, the rest of the sentence shows that this means that the substance
of something which is one in number is itself one in number (cf. 1016
bl-3, 8-9,
1052
a33-4). Hence, the substance of Socrates, who is one in number, must
itself be one in number. Since the universal species man is not one in number, it
cannot be the substance of Socrates or any other man. This position is in line
with Aristotle's view that the principles of individuals must themselves be indi-
viduals (1071
a20-4, Phys. 195
b26). And an example of this assumption occurs in
Z 14 (1039
a30-2): 'If then there is a man in himself who is a "this" and exists
apart, those things from which he is composed, for example animal and two-
footed, must also be "thises" and separable (xwpiard) and substances' (cf.
1040
a18-19). So while Albritton's alternative solution to the dilemma of 999
b
20-3 may indeed be an alternative solution, it cannot be Aristotle's solution.
A further difficulty with Albritton's suggested escape from the dilemma of
999
b2O-3 is that Aristotle argues against it in the immediately following passage
(999
b24-6): 'Again, one might be puzzled about the principles for the following
reason. If they are one in form, nothing will be one in number, not even the one
itself and being itself.' I take the argument to be that if the principles of things
are one in form only, then nothing will be one in number. And since this is
absurd, the principles of things cannot be one in form only. This interpretation
is supported by 1086
b37-1087
a4. In both passages Aristotle is considering the
same problem: are the principles of things universals (i.e. one in form only (cf.
1052
a29-36)) or particulars (i.e. one in number only)? 999
b24-6 says that the
consequence of the assumption that the principles are one in form only is that
nothing will be one in number. In 1086
b37-1087
a4 Aristotle says: 'But if the
principles are universal, either the substances composed from them will also be
universal, or what is not substance will be prior to substance; for the universal
is not substance, but the element or principle is universal, and the element or
principle is prior to those things of which it is the principle or element.'
17 The
part of the sentence following the semicolon states the premisses justifying the
second alternative conclusion of the hypothesis that the principles are universals
(cf. 1038
b23-9, 1070
b2-4, 1088
b3-4, Phys. 189
a33-4), but it is the first
alternative that is relevant here. It rests on the assumption that if the principles
are universals, then that of which they are the principles must also be universals.
And so, if all the principles are universals, then all the things of which they are
the substance will also be universal, i.e. nothing will be one in number. Here, as
in 999
b24-6, Aristotle treats this conclusion as evidently absurd.
We are not yet justified in taking the argument in 999
b24-6 as expressing
Aristotle's own view since it occurs in the statement of the arguments supporting
" 'Problems in Metaphysics Z, Chapter in 1087
al. But even if he is right, that the
13', op. cit., p. 235. resulting sentence, when left intact, expresses
17 Ross's text. Jaeger brackets f\ KO.1 ai a view that Aristotle would assent to is
eK TOVTUIV oitoicu KCL66\OV and does not shown by 1087
a21-2 (quoted below, p. 83).
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one side of an aporia. Thus, for example, the second argument against the
thesis that the principles of things are one in form only is (999 26-7): 'And how
will there be knowledge if there is not a one over many?' And it is certain that
Aristotle does not accept this argument for making the principles of things one
in number (1040
b27-30, 1086
b5-7;/l«. Post. 77
a5-9, 85
b18-22).
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In order to justify the ascription of the argument in question to Aristotle we
must see what his solution to the aporia is. I have quoted his arguments against
the suggestion that the principles of things are one in form. Aristotle next dis-
'cusses the suggestion that the principles are one in number (999
b27-1000
a4):
But if each of the principles is one in number, and it is not as with perceptible things where
there are different principles for different things (e.g. since this syllable is the same in
form, these principles are also the same in form; for these will be different in number) —
but if it is not like this but the principles of things are one in number, there will not be any-
thing else besides the elements; for the one in number does not differ from the particular
. . . Just as, if the elements of sound were limited in number, all letters would necessarily be
just as many as the elements, since there would not be two or more letters the same in form.
The result of the assumption that the principles are one in number is that no-
thing will exist besides the principles. And this is absurd. Now here it is very
important to see exactly what hypothesis it is which leads to this result. It is not
simply the hypothesis that the principles are one in number, but this plus the
assumption that they are unique in their kind. This is explained by Aristotle
with the analogy of syllables and letters. The consequence that nothing exists
besides the principles does not follow if the principles are conceived to be one in
number but in such a way that there are many individual principles which are the
same in kind. In the same way there can be many 'A's which are one in number
and the same in kind and in this way there is no difficulty in their constituting
many 'BA's. Whereas if there is but one 'A', clearly not more than one 'A' can
exist (cf. 1060
b29-30).
So both the hypothesis that the principles are one in kind only and the hypo-
thesis that the principles are one in number only lead to unacceptable results.
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" On Ross's account 999
b24-7 presents sidered absurd in itself (1086
b37-1087
a2,
. only one argument against the suggestion 21-4). and there it is certain that no epi-
that the principles of things are one in stemological considerations are in question,
form: 'The argument may be paraphrased Ernst Tugendhat does no better. He
thus: If a principle discovered by analysis glosses 999 24-7: 'Sind die eidetischen
of one thing can only be one in kind with a &PX<" hingegen e'iSei £v, so sind sie als Itpxa-i
principle discovered by analysis of another des Einzelnen selbst je einzelnen, aber unter-
thing, no two things will ever have a einander gleich. Doch "wie ist dann ein
numerically identical principle; but if there Wissen moglich" fragt Aristoteles 999
b27
is not this, if there is not a i-v £iri navruv "wenn es nicht ein Eines iiber den Vielen
how is knowledge possible?' (Aristotle's (ev ini noWuiv) gibt?'" (TI KATA TINOE)
Metaphysics, op. cit. i. 242). That this is (Freiburg, 1968), pp. 103-4). Like Ross,
not correct can be seen from the fact that Tugendhat fails to see that there are two
Ross presupposes that things are one in difficulties here, not one. Nor does Aristotle's
number, whereas Aristotle says that this is hypothesis that the principles are one in form
ruled out by the hypothesis that the prin- allow that they are one in number. What
ciples are one in form only. Furthermore, Aristotle says is that if the principles are one
the conclusion that nothing is one in in form obdev earai &pi0M<+> ev.
number is absurd, and is an absurdity i» Thus Joseph Owens (The Doctrine of
distinct from the conclusion that knowledge Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics
will not be possible. Thus in M 10, the con- (Toronto, 1963), p. 245) is mistaken in
elusion that all things are universals is con- saying that the point of the aporia is that82 ROBERT HEINAMAN
Aristotle's own solution is not hard to divine. If the principles are one in number
and form in such a way that there are many principles the same in form, none
of the problems with the other views arises. The first problem with the view that
the principles are one in form only was that as a result nothing can be one in
number. Of course if the principles are one in number, this difficulty disappears.
The second problem with this view was that it is hard to see how knowledge is
possible 'if there is not a one over many.' I have already pointed out that
Aristotle rejects this argument.
20 And finally the problem with the thesis that
the principles are one in number vanishes if we allow that there may be many
principles of the same form.
1002
b 12-32 proves both that this is Aristotle's solution to the aporia and, if
it needs proof, that the view that the principles are one in number in such a way
as to be unique in kind is the Platonic theory of Forms. There, Aristotle explains
that one reason why the Forms were posited was that, since sensible objects and
the intermediates have only specific unity, if Forms were not posited there would
be no definite number of principles. And he refers back to 999
b27-1000
a4 when
he says (1002
b30-2): 'But if we posit the Forms and that they are one in number
but not in form, we have mentioned the impossibilities that necessarily result'
(cf. 1039
a33-
b4, 9, 1040
a8-9, 26, Top. l43
b29-32). Again, the analogy of
letters is used to explain what the situation will be if one does not accept, as of
course Aristotle does not, the theory of Forms: there will be an unlimited
number of principles of the same form (1002
b 17-25).
Finally, M 10 states his solution to the aporia.
21 Again using the analogy of
'the two types of unity seem incompatible
in the same principles.' Significantly, he
quotes 999
b24-1000
a4 but omits
 b28-31
where Aristotle points out precisely that
the difficulty in the thesis that the principles
are one in number arises just in case the
principles are one in number only and not
also one in form. Similarly, the thesis that
the principles are one in form must be the
thesis that the principles are one in form
only since otherwise the conclusion that
obBev earat hpidnco ev would too obviously
fail to follow. And as I try to show below,
Aristotle does accept this argument.
Owens also misdescribes the arguments
of the aporia. On 999
b24-7 he says: 'If the
unity in the principles sought by Wisdom is
specific, nothing will be singular, not even
the highest so-called genera, Being and the
"one". But then there can be no scientific
knowledge; for scientific knowledge requires
a specific unity in singulars' (246). What
Aristotle says is that if nothing is one in
number, nai TO eiriaraodai wcj<r earai, el firi
TI eorai £v im 7rdiTcjp. Clearly it is the ev
in the i'v ini ir&VTcjv which is assumed must
be e'v ipifl/iV if there is to be knowledge.
(He is assuming the Platonic view that the
object of knowledge must be one in number.
Cf. 1002
b12-17, 22-5, and Cherniss, ACPA,
op. cit., pp. 221-2). He is not making the
point that each of 7rdi>ra>i> must be one in
number.
Owens continues: 'On the other hand,
if each of the principles is numerically one
and so not an instances of a species, there
will be nothing apart from it. A species in
this case would be a principle prior to the
first principles. No scientific knowledge of
such individual principles would be possible'
(ibid.). In fact, in the passage in question
(999
b27-lOOO
a4) Aristotle neither says nor
implies anything about species or knowledge.
And of course it is not the thesis under
examination — that the principles are one
in number - which in 999
b24-lOOO
a4 is
said to lead to the conclusion that
knowledge is not possible but rather the first
hypothesis that the principles are one in form.
20 I Cf. Physics 187
b10-ll: TCJV 8' hneipcjv
oioCjv Kal Kara jr\fj0o? Hal /car' elSoc b£vva-
TOV elSevai TCL in TOVTUV (cf. 996
al, 1002
b
17-19, 22-5, Pbys. 189
a12-13). Aristotle's
solution to the aporia is that although un-
limited in number, the principles are not
unlimited in kind.
21 Aristotle begins the chapter by
stating that the aporia to be discussed has
already been pointed out in B. A compari-
son of 999
b27-33 with 1086
b20-32 should
suffice to show that 999
b24-1000
a4 is at
least part of what he is referring to in B. (Cf.AN ARGUMENT IN METAPHYSICS Z 13 83
syllables and letters, he repeats the argument that if the principles are one in
number after the fashion of Platonic Forms, nothing will exist besides the
principles (1086
b20-32). Whereas if the principles are universals, either the
substances composed from them will be universals or non-substance will be prior
to substance (1086
b37-1087
a4). He then states his own view, which by this
time should be no surprise (1087
a4-10):
These all follow reasonably when they make the Ideas from elements and apart from the
substances (and Ideas] having the same form they claim that there is a single separate
entity. But if just as in the case of the elements of speech nothing prevents there being
many a's and b's and no a itself or b itself apart from the many, as far as this goes there will
be indefinitely many similar syllables."
Aristotle's solution to the aporia by itself constitutes strong evidence that
substantial forms are individuals. But our ulterior motive for going through the
aporia was to see if, from an examination of it, we could determine Aristotle's
attitude to the argument in 999 24-6 against the suggestion that the principles
are one in form only. I think we can now see that the argument is his own. The
argument assumes that if the principles were one in form only, i.e. universal, then
that of which they are the principles could not be one in number, i.e. would be
universals. Now the same premise is at work at 1086
b37-1087
a4 in the argument
against the view that the principles are universals. And this argument must be
Aristotle's own since it is the only argument advanced in M 10 against the
suggestion that the principles are universals. But if the argument is his, then so
are its premisses, and that premiss is explicitly stated near the end of the chapter
in support of his position (1087
a21-2): 'If the principles must be universal, what
is derived from them must also be universal.'
I conclude that Albritton's suggestion that the substance of men might be one
only in that it is one in form cannot be correct. Rather, it is against precisely
such a view that Aristotle argues in the Metaphysics.
Aristotle's solution to the aporia in 999
b24-1000
a4 supports the explanation
given above of 999
b2O-3. The alternatives presented in the former are: either the
principles are one in form and are not one in number, or the principles are one in
number and not one in form. It is the claim that the principles are both, in the
manner explained, which solves the aporia. In 999
b2O-3 again there are only two
alternatives: either 17 ovaia Ilia irairrcovor it is 7roXXd Kai Stcuftopd. And again the
solution is the rejection of the tacit assumption that if substances are one in
number, they cannot also be one in form.
Michael Woods has also attempted to avoid the conclusion that Z 13 is arguing
that no universal is substance. He begins by saying,
Aristotle's answer to the question 'What is ovola?' is that what is ovaia in the fullest sense is
the elSos or TI rji> elvai of something. . . . Thus Aristotle is presumably committed to holding
Robin, La Theorie platoniccienne, op. cit.,
p. 529 n. 478). There is no warrant for
Ross's claim that the question in 999^24-
1000
a4 is 'the same question' as that
raised in Z 14 (Aristotle's Metaphysics, op.
cit., i. 242). Nor, as he claims, is A 4 or 5
relevant since there the question is whether
the principles are the same by analogy and
this is distinct from the question whether
they are the same in number or the same in
form.
22 Syllables are used as analogues of
substances, and the oroixeta of syllables
as analogues of the principles of substances.
The view expressed in this passage is pre-
supposed in 1074
a31-3. Cf. 1071
a23, De
Caelo 278*18-20.84 ROBERT HEINAMAN
that the form of the species man is a substance. But this seems incompatible with the doc-
trine that nothing >ca66\ov can be substance: for man is surely predicated universally of
Socrates, Callias, etc. How can the species man be an oixjia, if any oiala has to belong
uxr I&iov to that of which it is the ovala?"
Woods's proposed solution to the problem is that Aristotle wishes to deny only
that rd KadoXov Xeydneva are substances, i.e. universals that are not species, while
TO. KadoXov which are not rd KadoXov Xeydfieva are substances, viz. species.
It seems clear that this distinction between rd KadoXov and rd KadoXov
Xeyoneva is wholly illusory. First, Z 13 itself appears to contradict Woods's
suggestion. Aristotle's second argument against the suggestion that the universal
is substance is (1038
b 15-16): eriovaia Xeyerai TO JLW? KCLO' vnoKeifievov,To8e
KadoXov Kad' vnoaeinevdv nvoq Xeyercu det. Woods says that this has 'to be
regarded, on the view I am defending, as claiming, not that everything universal
is said of vnoKeifievov n but that everything predicated universally is said of
vnoneitievdvn.
2* This is a feeble defence. Even if that is a possible reading of
the sentence it is clearly highly unlikely. Secondly, Aristotle uses TO KadoXov
and TO KadoXov Xeydfxevov interchangeably even in chapter 13 in a way which
would be inexplicable if Aristotle attached the fundamental importance to the
distinction which Woods claims. Thus at 1038
b6-9 we read: So/cei 5e Kai TO
KadoXov QXTIOP now ewax (i&XiOTa, Kai eivat, apxn 12 KadoXov • Sto eireXdcofiev
nepi TQ&rov • £ouie yap oMvarov eivai ovoiav elvai cmovv TUV KadoXov Xeyonevwv.
According to Woods, Aristotle says here, 'Let us discuss x' and then proceeds to
discuss y. Similarly, when Aristotle denies that universals are substances he uses
TO KadoXov and TO Kadokov Xeyoyievov interchangeably (TO KadoXov Xeyonevov —
1038
b8-9, 1041M; TO KadoXov - 1003
a8, 1042
a21, 1053
b16, 1062
b21, 1087
a2).
Furthermore, Aristotle defines a universal as what can belong to, and therefore
be predicated of, many particulars (999
b34-1000
al;De Int. 17
a38-40),
expressly licenses such predications,
is and makes them himself.
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I wish to conclude by pointing out that in denying that any of Aristotle's
substances are universals I do not mean to deny that some Aristotelian forms
are universals. Some forms are universals but none of these universal forms are
substantial. Only individual forms are substances. That Aristotle did draw this
distinction between individual substantial forms and universal non-substantial
forms is shown by a passage in M 10. In that chapter, Aristotle is defending the
view that the principles of substances (1086
b20), which are \iopixJTa and one in
number (1086
b16-19), are themselves xuipUJTa and one in number (1087
a7-25),
but in such a way that there are many principles which are the same in kind
(1087*7-10; cf. 999
b28-31). It is clear that the principles whose individuality
Aristotle is defending are forms. Prior to offering his defence, Aristotle develops
aporiai which arise for the view that the principles are particulars and for the
"i 'Problems in Metaphysics Z, Chapter 1007
a10-ll, 12, 16, 17, ^10-1, 24, 33,
13', op. cit., p. 219. 1008
a4,
 b19, 23H-, 1015
b31-3, 1022
a
"Ibid., p. 230. 34-5, 1028
a15-18, 1041
a17-18, 22, 1062
a
" 995
b29-31, 998
D15-16, 999H-6, 15, 27, 29-30, 1087
a21;£. N. 1135
a29, 1147
1006
b14, 1007
a33-4,
 b16, 1035
a7-8,
 bl-3, *6; Top. lQ3
b29-3O, 125
b39; An. Pr.
27-8, 1054
a16-17, 1088
a8-13;£. N. 1147
a 43
a25-32;.4n. Post. 73
a3O;D<f Int. 21
a2-
4-5; Top. 121
b3-4, 11-14; An. Post. 83
a24- 3, 19-20; De Motu Anim. 7Ol
a13-15, 27;
5,
 b4;De Int. 2O
b34, 37-8, 21
a18-2O,
 bl; Pbys. 224*15; Parva Nat. 458
b14; De Gen.
Parva Nat. 467
b21-2. Anim. 767
b3O-l.
" 1006
a33,
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view that the principles are universals. However, the aporiai for both positions
present difficulties for the Platonic view that the principles of substances are
universals separate from sensible substances, but also one in number and thus
unique in their kind. So that after developing the aporiai Aristotle says (1087H-
7): 'These all follow reasonably when they make the Ideas from elements and
apart from the substances [and Ideas] having the same form (TO airro eiSoc),
27
and claim that there is a single separate entity.' Difficulties arise, Aristotle says,
when apart from the substances having the same form, the Platonists separate a
single form. Clearly 'the same form' (TO avro effio?) here does not refer to a
Platonic Form since it is explicitly distinguished from such a Form, but rather to
the form which is shared by substances that are the same in kind (cf. 1071
a12-
13). And since it is common to many particular substances it is a universal (De
Part. Anim. 644
a27-8). It is also clear that Aristotle does not consider this
universal form to be a substance, since two lines earlier he has said 'the universal
is not substance' in support of the view, which is his own, that the principles of
substances cannot be universals. So it should be evident that Aristotle clearly
distinguishes this universal form which is not a substance from the substantial
forms which are the principles of the substances which have that universal in
common.
28
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27 • There appears to be no reason to
accept Ps.-Alexander's reading TO avroeiSoq.
Cf. Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics, op. cit.
ii, ad. !oc.; Robin, La The'orie platonicienne,
op. cit., p. 531 n. 480.
" Another passage where the difference
between the universal form and the indi-
vidual form emerges is 1074
a31-5: 'For if
there are many heavens as there are many
men, the principle of each will be one in
form but many in number. But those
things which are many in number have
matter (for one and the same definition is
of many, but Socrates is one).' There is one
definition of the universal, but the principles
of individual men are themselves individuals.
This is what Aristotle argues in A 5
(1070
a20-l): apxh yap TO Ka8' '
TCJV KO6' HKOOTOV.
James Lesher's contention that Aristotle's
substantial forms are universals rests on his
confusion of the universal form with the
individual substantial form ("Aristotle on
ROBERT HEINAMAN
Form, Substance and Universals: A
Dilemma', Pbronesis, 16 (1971), 174-6).
Commenting on a passage from A 5 (1071
a
i 27-9: Kai TCOV <oi>oiC)v> iv TavrCp e'iSei
<ra atrux> erepa, obic eCSei a\\' tin TW KO8'
ixaoTOv 'a\\o, fj Te ofi i)\rj Kai TO ei£o? Kai TO
iavftoav Kai ^) iufi, TC? KO66\OV 6e Xoyty raina)
Lesher says: 'Aristotle explicitly says here
that the universal definition of each of our
forms is the same . . . Thus Albritton cannot
conclude from this that the form is not a
universal. . . .' The definition defines the
universal form, but it doesn't follow that
your form and mine are not numerically
different. As Aristotle says (1O16'
)36): 6oa
apiBtiCti <!e> Kai e'lSei £f, 6oa 8' eiSei oil
vavra apvdnC?. For example, your form and
mine.
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